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ABSTRACT
At least since 1819, courts have prohibited double patenting—where
an inventor has two patents on the same or obvious variations of the same
invention. There have always been two basic justifications for prohibiting
double patenting. The first focused on the patentee: bad actors might try
to improperly extend their patent monopoly by filing serial applications.
The second focused on the public’s rights: the bargain of the patent is that
in exchange for the inventor getting a term-limited patent, the public is
entitled to use the claimed invention (and its obvious variations) once the
patent expires. This public-rights rationale is broader, and it applies
independent of whether the patentee’s filing of serial applications allows
her to extend the patent term.
The patentee-based justification had more purchase in the olden
days—when a patent’s term was determined by its issue date. Every new
patent that issued would get a new term. Since 1995, though, a patent’s
term is 20 years from the earliest effective filing date—a date that stays
the same independent of whether the inventor strings out her patent
applications—so the inventor cannot really game the system. On the other
hand, the public still cannot receive the fruit of its bargain if it cannot use
a claimed invention as soon as a patent expires.
The previously low-stakes debate about the reason for prohibiting
double patenting now matters. Most significantly, is there a doublepatenting problem for a parent patent where the parent gets patent-term
adjustment, but the child does not? On the patentee-based justification,
there may well not be a problem for the parent, but on the public-rights
based justification, there would be. Inventors that receive patent-term
adjustment on a parent patent have to decide whether to pursue
continuation applications, as continuation applications are likely to not
receive the same amount of adjustment. Depending on how the law on
double patenting evolves, the continuation patents may cut short the term
of the parent patent—what this article will call patent patricide. For
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patents on pharmaceutical drugs, the question of patent patricide can be
worth billions of dollars.
INTRODUCTION
At least since 1819, 1 courts have prohibited “double patenting”—
where an inventor has two patents on the same or obvious variations of
the same invention. There have always been two basic justifications for
prohibiting double patenting. The first focuses on the patentee: bad actors
may try to improperly extend their monopoly by filing serial applications.
The second focuses on the public’s rights: the bargain of the patent is that
in exchange for the inventor getting a term-limited patent, the public is
entitled to use claimed inventions (and obvious variations thereof) once
patents expire. This public-rights rationale is broader, and it applies
independent of whether double patenting allows a patentee to extend her
term.
However justified, the prohibition on double patenting was
particularly important back when a patent’s term was tied to its issue date.
If an inventor kept getting patents on the same subject matter—each one
expiring later and later—the patentee would be able to extend her patent
monopoly beyond its statutory term, and the public would not be able to
reap the benefits of its bargain.
The patentee-based justification for prohibiting double patenting
nowadays, when a patent’s term is twenty years from filing, is of more
“limited force.” 2 Bad-acting patentees are generally unable to extend their
exclusivity by filing more and more patents since the new patents’ terms
will be limited by the filing dates of the original patents. On the other
hand, the public still cannot receive the fruits of its bargain if it cannot use
a claimed invention as soon as a patent expires. Thus, the previously
inconsequential ivory-tower debate about why obviousness-type double
patenting (ODP) is prohibited now matters. Most significantly, inventors
that receive a patent-term adjustment on a parent patent have to decide
whether to pursue continuation applications, 3 as continuation applications
are likely not going to receive patent-term adjustments. Depending on
* Dr. Kazhdan is an Associate Solicitor at the United States Patent and Trademark Office. The views
and opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the views or opinions of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office. Kazhdan thanks Dmitry Karshtedt and Thomas Krause
for their helpful and thoughtful comments on this article and thanks the editors of the Akron Law
Review for their exceptional job editing.
1. Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail Factory, 18 F. Cas. 578, 579 (C.C.D. Mass. 1819) (No. 10,430).
2. In re Fallaux, 564 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
3. See infra Section I.C.
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how the law on double patenting evolves, the continuation patents may
cut short the term of the parent patent—what this article will call “patent
patricide.” For patents on pharmaceutical drugs, the question of patent
patricide can be worth billions of dollars.
This article proceeds as follows. Section I provides a primer on
patent prosecution and double patenting. In Section II, the article
describes the various reasons courts have given for prohibiting double
patenting: some courts believe that double patenting would extend the
patentee’s monopoly beyond her permitted term, while others believe it
would violate the public’s right to freely use inventions claimed in expired
patents. As this article will show, the Patent Act assumes a patentee-based
reason, but the Code of Federal Regulations has provisions that make
sense only with a public-rights justification. Section III explains that the
choice of rationale has significant implications for earlier-issued but laterexpiring patents—particularly for cases of patent patricide—and different
tribunals have come to different conclusions. Finally, Section IV
concludes that allowing patent patricide creates strange and unnecessary
problems. Instead, a patent’s term should be set when it issues—so a laterissuing continuation application should not be able to cut short the term
of the parent.
I. A PRIMER ON DOUBLE PATENTING
Sections II through IV assume an understanding of patent terms,
patent prosecution, and double patenting. This section explains those
concepts.
A.

Patent Term

From 1790 to 1994, a patent’s term was keyed to when the patent
issued: patents that issued between 1790 and 1835 were valid for 14 years
from issuance; patents that issued between 1836 and 1860 were valid for
21 years from issuance; and patents that issued between 1861 and 1994
were valid for 17 years from issuance. 4 The nice thing about patent terms
being keyed to the patent’s issue date was that an inventor would get the
same patent term no matter how long it took the Patent Office to issue the
patent.
In 1994, Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
(URAA). Under the URAA, patents filed in 1995 or later expire 20 years
4. Neel U. Sukhatme, Regulatory Monopoly and Differential Pricing in the Market for
Patents, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1855, 1895–96 n.146 (2014).
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from when the patent was filed (or its effective filing date—as described
below). 5 If it takes three years for the Patent Office to issue a patent, then
that works out to be the same term—17 years from issuance—as before.
However, if the Patent Office takes much longer, then the inventor will
not get a reasonable term. As an extreme example, if the Patent Office
takes 20 years to issue a patent, the patent will expire before it is even
issued. Congress therefore enacted various bases for adjusting a patent’s
term to account for Patent Office delay. Already in 1994, with the
enactment of the URAA, Congress provided patent-term adjustment
(PTA) to account for the time lost during review by the Patent Office’s
Board of Appeals and Interferences. 6 Since then, Congress has allowed
for PTA based on other Patent Office delays as well. 7
The Patent Act also provides for extending a patent to make up for
delay at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Before an
innovator company can market a new drug, it needs approval from the
FDA. 8 Sometimes, the FDA-approval process can interfere with a
company’s ability to recoup the money it invested in developing a drug.
As the Supreme Court has explained, “the ‘clock’ on [an inventor’s]
patent term will be running even though he is not yet able to derive any
profit from the invention” because the government has not yet approved
it. 9 Consider, for example, a company that invents a new drug and files
both a patent application and a request for FDA approval of that drug in
2000. If the Patent Office issues the patent promptly, but the FDA does
not approve the product until 2020, the company would have no patentbased market exclusivity. In 1984 (even before the URAA), Congress
enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act, which provides for Patent Term
Extension (PTE) to make up for this delay. 10
B.

How Patents are Prosecuted

To receive a patent, an inventor files a patent application with the
Patent Office. There are two kinds of applications: provisional and
nonprovisional. Provisional applications are not relevant to this article.
An inventor who files a nonprovisional application must include a
“specification” that describes and enables the invention. 11 The application
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (Supp. V 2017).
Id.
Id. § 154(b).
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012).
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669–70 (1990).
35 U.S.C. § 156 (Supp. V 2017).
35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(2)(A) (2012); MPEP § 601 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 6

1022

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[53:1017

receives a “filing date,” which is the date the Patent Office receives the
application. 12 The filing date of the application is important for several
reasons, including that: (1) it defines the world of prior art that can be
raised against the patent 13 and (2) the patent expires 20 years from the
filing date. 14
However, in some circumstances, the effective filing date of an
application is not the date the application itself was filed, but rather the
date of an earlier-filed application. 15 These situations involve one of the
three types of applications: (1) continuation applications, (2) divisional
applications, and (3) continuation-in-part applications. 16
Continuation Applications
Sometimes, a specification will support numerous different claims.
For a variety of reasons, the inventor might not want to pursue all the
possible claims in a single application. For example, the inventor might
worry that prosecuting all the claims may be expensive or that prosecution
of more-ambitious claims might hold up the issuance of the less-ambitious
claims. Consequently, the inventor might choose to prosecute one set of
claims first. Before the Patent Office issues the patent with the first set of
claims, the parent patent, the inventor can file a continuation application.
Even though the continuation application is, technically, filed later, it is
accorded the same effective filing date as the parent patent. However, the
disclosure in the continuation application cannot contain new matter. 17
Divisional Applications
Divisional applications are like continuation applications and also
cannot include new matter. 18 The difference is that an inventor files a
divisional application to claim an invention that is independent of the
invention claimed in the parent patent. Sometimes, an inventor will decide
to file a divisional application on her own based on an independent
determination that the claims she seeks to pursue in the divisional
application are distinct from the claims in the parent. For purposes of this

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(4) (2012).
Id. § 103; see MPEP § 2141.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (Supp. V 2017).
Id. §§ 120–121, 154(a)(2).
MPEP § 201.02 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).
MPEP § 201.07 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).
MPEP § 201.06 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).
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article, this type of applicant-initiated divisional application is no different
than a standard continuation application.
However, the Patent Office often forces a divisional application. 19
Specifically, if an applicant files numerous claims in a first application,
the examiner might decide that the claims cover distinct inventions, and
the examiner can then insist that the applicant restrict the claims in the
first application to a single invention. The inventor can fight this
restriction requirement, but she can just file a divisional application to
prosecute the non-elected claims. 20
Continuation-in-Part Applications
A continuation-in-part application is like a standard continuation
application, but an inventor is permitted to add new matter to the
disclosure of a continuation-in-part application. The tradeoff is that the
claims in the continuation-in-part application are afforded the filing date
of the parent application only if the parent application contained a
disclosure that supports the claims in the continuation-in-part
application. 21
C.

The Two Types of Double Patenting

The Patent Act entitles an inventor to only “a patent,” singular, for
an invention. 22 Accordingly, an inventor cannot have two patents on the
“same invention.” 23
Even where an inventor is not trying to get two patents on exactly
the same invention, courts nonetheless forbid an inventor from getting two
patents with claims to obvious variants of the same invention—ODP. 24
There are several rationales for the prohibition on ODP, and they will be
discussed at length below. For now, suffice it to make the intuitive point
that someone who invents one new idea should not be able to both get a
patent that expires in 2020 and get a second patent on the same or an
obvious variation of that invention that does not expire until 2030. The
public is getting cheated out of using the invention (or its obvious variant)
in an expired patent, and the inventor is getting more patent term than she
deserves. Another reason, albeit less significant, for prohibiting ODP is
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

35 U.S.C. § 121 (2012).
See MPEP § 201.06.
See MPEP § 201.08 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
MPEP § 804 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).
Id.
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that if an inventor could get multiple patents on the same invention, she
might sell some patents and keep others. An accused infringer could be
subject to multiple lawsuits from the owners of the different patents with
no collateral estoppel on judgments from one to the other—because the
patent owners would be different. 25
Importantly, Congress forbids ODP rejections for divisional
applications that an inventor files in response to a Patent Office restriction
requirement. The parent and divisional patents cannot be used as ODP
references against one another.26
Aside from this congressionally enacted safe harbor, courts
developed a simple ODP workaround for inventors who want to receive a
second patent for an obvious variation of a previously patented invention.
The inventor can file a “terminal disclaimer” in which she disclaims the
term of the second patent that would otherwise extend beyond the term of
the first patent 27—often called the reference patent. So, say the reference
patent expired on January 1, 2020, the inventor would disclaim the term
of the second patent on the same or an obvious variant that extended
beyond that date. To avoid the multiple-lawsuit problem, the Patent Office
requires that the terminal disclaimer also include a provision that the
disclaimed patent will not be enforceable if the challenged and reference
patents are not commonly owned. 28
The interaction between double patenting and PTA/PTE is
interesting: the Patent Act is explicit that PTA cannot extend a patent’s
term beyond the date in a terminal disclaimer. 29 The Patent Act does not
say whether PTE can extend the term of a patent beyond a terminally
disclaimed date, but the Federal Circuit has ruled that it can. 30
II. THE REASON FOR PROHIBITING ODP
Although double patenting has been prohibited for two centuries,
courts have never settled on a single rationale. Instead, there are two types
of justifications. One is patentee based: were an inventor allowed to
receive multiple patents with different expiration dates, the inventor
would receive more than their congressionally allotted exclusivity. The
second justification is based on the public’s rights: the public should be
25. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329, 350 (1971).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2012).
27. 37 C.F.R. § 1.321 (2018).
28. Id. § 1.321(c).
29. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(B) (2012).
30. Novartis AG v. Ezra Ventures LLC, 909 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Merck & Co.
v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., 482 F.3d 1317, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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free to use claimed inventions (and their obvious variations) once a patent
expires. The rationale matters. In some cases, the second patent does not
improperly extend the patentee’s term, but the public is still blocked from
using an invention in an expired patent.
A.

Courts Give Multiple Reasons for Prohibiting ODP

Courts have been offering these two different justifications for
almost as long as the prohibition on double patenting has existed. Perhaps
the first discussion of double patenting came in dicta in an 1818 case.
Justice Story (riding circuit) addressed a patentee-based concern over
double patenting: allowing an inventor to obtain serial patents might
create “double recompense” and “the term of the exclusive right might be
prolonged for a great length of time.” 31 He therefore expressed “very great
doubts” whether an inventor could get two patents for the same
invention. 32
The next year, Justice Story addressed double patenting directly in
Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail Factory, again riding circuit. 33 He held that an
inventor cannot “have in use at the same time two valid patents for the
same invention.” 34 Justice Story began by again focusing on the patenteebased problem: Congress awarded inventors a set patent term, but, if an
inventor “can successively take out at different times new patents for the
same invention, he may perpetuate his exclusive right during a century.” 35
Justice Story concluded, though, with a public-rights justification: double
patenting would defeat “the public[’s] . . . acquired . . . inchoate interest”
in using the invention after the first patent expired. 36
The Supreme Court adopted the prohibition on double patenting at
least by the middle of the 19th century. 37 For example, in O’Reilly v.
Morse, the Supreme Court explained that Morse could not have two
patents that “embraced” the same invention—in that case, an 1840 patent
claiming any method of transmitting information through electromagnets
and an 1846 patent claiming a specific method. 38 However, it was only
31. Barrett v. Hall, 2 F. Cas. 914, 924 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 1,047).
32. Id.
33. Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail Factory, 18 F. Cas. 578, 579 (C.C.D. Mass. 1819) (No. 10,430).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., McCreary v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 141 U.S. 459, 467–68 (1891); Suffolk Co.
v. Hayden, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 315, 319 (1865).
38. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 114 (1853); cf. Douglas L. Rogers, Double
Patenting: Follow-on Pharmaceutical Patents that Suppress Competition, 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 317, 337–38 (2017).
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with its 1894 decision in Miller v. Eagle Manufacturing Co. that the Court
gave any justification. 39 Citing Justice Story’s Odiorne decision, the
Supreme Court listed both problems with double patenting: (1) the
public’s rights: “the power to create a monopoly is exhausted by the first
patent,” and (2) the “further,” patentee-based reason: “a new and later
patent for the same invention would operate to extend or prolong the
monopoly beyond the period allowed by law.” 40 According to one scholar,
by 1916 most courts were relying on the patentee-based rationale. 41
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.), one of the
Federal Circuit’s two predecessor courts, likewise mixed and matched
between these two justifications. In one opinion it declared that “[d]ouble
patenting is . . . primarily intended to prevent prolongation of monopoly”
by the patentee; otherwise, the patentee could file a first patent with a
“sketchy forecast” of an invention and continue to file continuations-inpart to prolong the monopoly. 42 But in another opinion it justified ODP
based on the public’s rights: “when the right to exclude granted by a patent
expires at the end of the patent term, the public shall be free to use the
invention.” 43
The Federal Circuit continued providing both justifications. For
example, the Federal Circuit in Longi quoted Judge Rich for the
proposition that double patenting exists to ensure that the “public should
be [free] to assum[e] that upon the expiration of the patent it will be free
to use not only the invention claimed in the patent but also modifications
or variants which would have been obvious.” 44 On the other hand, Judge
Rich himself cited Longi and emphasized that ODP exists “to prevent
improper timewise extension of the patent right” by the patentee. 45

39. Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 198 (1894); see EMERSON STRINGHAM, DOUBLE
PATENTING § 2800, 25 (Miller is considered “the most famous decision” on double patenting); see
also RUSSELL WILES, EFFECT ON A LATER BROAD PATENT OF AN EARLIER NARROW PATENT TO THE
SAME INVENTOR, ON A COPENDING APPLICATION (1905), reprinted in EMERSON STRINGHAM,
DOUBLE PATENTING 501, 507 (1933) (Miller “is and always has been the leading case upon the
subject.”).
40. Miller, 151 U.S. at 198 (citing Odiorne, 18 F. Cas. at 579).
41. CHARLES H. SHAFFER, DOUBLE PATENTING (1916), reprinted in EMERSON STRINGHAM,
DOUBLE PATENTING 516, 517 (1933).
42. In re Braithwaite, 379 F.2d 594, 601 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
43. In re Robeson, 331 F.2d 610, 614 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
44. In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892–93 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Zickendraht, 319 F.2d
225, 232 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (Rich, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
45. In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 592 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (second emphasis added).
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The Patent Act Assumes a Patentee-Based Justification

In 1952, Congress enacted § 121 of the Patent Act. This was
Congress’s first clear recognition of and acquiescence to double
patenting, 46 and § 121 views ODP as a patentee-based problem. Until
1952, even when an examiner insisted that claims be divided, the claims
of the divisional application could still be rejected for ODP over the first
application and vice-versa. 47 This was unfair to the patentee—so much so
that the C.C.P.A. had a rule that “every reasonable doubt appertaining to
the [double patenting] issue should be resolved in [the patentee’s] favor”
if the patentee divided her claims in response to a restriction
requirement. 48 In 1952, Congress did away with the problem, adding §
121, which provides that, when an inventor files a divisional application
in response to a restriction requirement, one restricted application “shall
not be used as a reference” against the other.49 This exception to ODP
addresses only a patentee-based problem: since the inventor is playing by
the rules (dividing applications when told to do so), it would be unfair to
the patentee if she had to face a double patenting rejection. Section 121
does nothing to address the public’s rights. A member of the public will
still be prohibited from using an invention (or its obvious variant) claimed
in an expired patent.
C.

Regulatory Provisions Reflect a Public-Rights Justification

The Patent Office’s regulations, meanwhile, evince a concern for the
public’s rights. As described above, an inventor can traverse an ODP
rejection by filing a terminal disclaimer. The 1952 Patent Act provides
that an inventor can “disclaim or dedicate to the public . . . any terminal
part of the term . . . of the patent granted or to be granted.” 50 The two
primary drafters of the Act, Pasquale J. Federico and Giles S. Rich, both

46. William T. Bullinger is thus mistaken in asserting that the 1952 Act “eliminate[d] the law
of double patenting.” William T. Bullinger, “Double Patenting” and the 1952 Patent Act, 10 PAT.,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. RES. & EDUC. 389, 399 (1966).
47. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. N. Petrochemical Co., 784 F.2d 351, 358 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (Newman, J., concurring) (citing pre-1952 cases), cited with approval in Boehringer Ingelheim
Int’l GmbH v. Barr Labs., Inc., 592 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also STRINGHAM, supra
note 39, § 2851A, 357 (citing cases).
48. In re Cady, 77 F.2d 106, 108 (C.C.P.A. 1935).
49. See 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2012).
50. Id. § 253.
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explained that terminal disclaimers were created specifically to allow
inventors to get around ODP rejections. 51
The statute’s disclaimer provision talks about disclaiming terms, but
it says nothing about common ownership of the two patents. And early
terminal disclaimers addressed only the patent’s term. 52 Extending term
is both a patentee-based problem and violates the public’s rights. And the
C.C.P.A. focused on the patentee-based problem: holding that that
terminal disclaimers would not work in “a situation where any abuse of
the terminal disclaimer is suggested.” 53
However, the Patent Office ultimately shifted the doctrine to require
public-rights-specific provisions. In 1971, the Patent Office issued a
regulation that a terminal disclaimer would overcome a double-patenting
rejection only if the disclaimer included a provision that the patent would
be enforceable when the disclaimed patent was “commonly owned with
the application or patent which formed the basis for the rejection.” 54 The
C.C.P.A. later upheld the regulation, and the common-ownership
provision is now a standard part of terminal disclaimers. 55 The need for
common ownership makes sense in the public-rights justification.
Because of collateral estoppel, if the patents are commonly owned, a
member of the public cannot be sued by the same patent owner for
infringing the same invention—even if claimed in different patents.
Common ownership does nothing to address a misbehaving patentee.
III. THE PATENTEE-BASED AND PUBLIC-RIGHTS JUSTIFICATIONS
DIVERGE FOR EARLIER-FILED/ISSUED BUT LATER-EXPIRING PATENTS
In addition to the question of divisional applications and terminal
disclaimers, which are addressed by statute and regulation, respectively,
the justification for ODP matters in cases where the reference patent is

51. See Pasquale J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 161, 210 (1993) (reprinting his comments from the 1954 edition of Title 35 of the United
States Code Annotated) (explaining that § 253 was “contemplated” as a means of “combatting a
defense of double patenting.”); see also Selected Speeches of Giles S. Rich, 3 J. FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y
103, 112 (2009) (reprinting his speech to the New York Patent Law Association held on November
6, 1952) (explaining that one might file a terminal disclaimer “if you are in a double-patenting
situation.”).
52. See In re Gibbs, 437 F.2d 486, 487 n.2 (1971).
53. In re Robeson, 331 F.2d 610, 615 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
54. 36 Fed. Reg. 7312 (Apr. 17, 1971); 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(b) (1972). Before the 1971
promulgation, the Patent Office had an internal rule that a terminal disclaimer had to provide that the
patent would “expire immediately” if it stopped being “commonly owned.” In re Van Ornum, 686
F.2d 937, 948 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (quoting 834 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1615 (Jan. 31, 1967)).
55. Van Ornum, 686 F.2d at 944–48; MPEP § 1490 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).
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later-filed (pre-URAA) or later-issued (post-URAA) than the challenged
patent.
A.

Earlier-Filed but Later-Expiring Patents Before the URAA

As explained above, before the URAA, a patent’s expiration date
depended on the date of issue, and, usually, an earlier-issued patent was
filed earlier too. So double patenting would normally be a problem for
only the later-filed and later-issued patent. But not always. Sometimes,
the earlier-filed patent would get held up during prosecution, and a laterfiled patent would issue first. What then? The patentee would argue that
she should not lose protection just because the Patent Office delayed
issuing the patent, so the earlier-filed patent should not be subject to an
ODP challenge from the later-filed patent. On the other hand, the public
would argue that it should still be free to use the inventions and obvious
variations of claims in expired patents; the inventor’s tortuous path to
getting her patent is not the public’s problem. Courts were divided on this
question of earlier-filed but later-issued patents.
Suffolk Co. v. Hayden 56
Hayden filed for a patent in 1854, but, “[f]or some cause,” the
application just lingered in the Patent Office. 57 So Hayden filed another
patent application for the “same improvements” in 1857, which the Patent
Office issued that same year. 58 The earlier-filed 1854 application,
meanwhile, did not issue until 1860. 59

56.
57.
58.
59.

Suffolk Co. v. Hayden, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 315 (1865).
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id.
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Figure 1: Timeline of Hayden’s patent prosecution

When Hayden sued for infringement of the 1857 patent, the
defendant argued that the 1857 patent should be invalid for double
patenting over the earlier-filed but later-issued 1860 patent. 60 The
Supreme Court held that was exactly backwards: “The last [issued], not
the first, is void.” 61 The Supreme Court later summarized Suffolk as
“deciding that it is the issue date, and not the filing date, which determines
priority to patents issued to the same inventor on the same machine.” 62
Suffolk, itself, can be reconciled with both patentee and public-rights
justifications for prohibiting double patenting. The patentee is still getting
one full term of protection, and the public is still permitted to use the
invention as soon as one patent expires. However, courts diverged on how
to apply Suffolk.
The Thomson-Houston Electric Co. Cases 63
The Second Circuit added nuance to Suffolk’s rule in a series of cases
relating to Thomson-Houston’s patents. Relying on a patentee-based
justification for double patenting, the Second Circuit held that, sometimes,
the earlier-filed but later-issued patent could also be immune to an ODP
challenge.

60. Id. at 319.
61. Id.
62. Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 197 (1894).
63. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Winchester Ave. Ry. Co., 71 F. 192 (C.C.D. Conn. 1895);
Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Elmira & H. Ry. Co., 71 F. 396 (2d Cir. 1896); Thomson-Houston
Elec. Co. v. Hoosick Ry. Co., 82 F. 461 (2d Cir. 1897).
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Thomson-Houston applied for a patent in 1887, but that patent got
tied up in an interference proceeding and only issued in 1893. 64 In 1888,
while that application was pending, Thomson-Houston filed another
patent that issued in 1890. 65 As in Suffolk, this led to a later-filed but
earlier-issued patent. Suffolk had already held that the patent that issued
in 1890 was valid, but the question was whether the one that issued in
1893 might also be valid. The circuit court for the district of Connecticut
held that the 1893 patent claimed a genus while the later-filed but earlierissued 1890 patent claimed a species, and, in such cases, the patentee
should not “be deprived of his broad patent where the application for such
patent was made first, and was delayed in the patent office through no
fault of the inventor. Such a ruling would be a reproach to the law.” 66 The
same patent came up again a few years later (with a different defendant)
in the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit declared that it “should concur”
with the Connecticut court if the patents really could be divided into a
genus versus a species patent, but, in its view, the two patents were to the
“same invention,” and it invalidated the 1893 patent. 67 Other 19th century
cases are to the same effect.68 This focus on justice to the patentee is,
naturally, consistent with a patentee-based rationale for ODP. The
concern that the public will not be permitted to use an invention claimed
in an expired patent applies independently of whether or how the issuance
of the first-filed patent got tied up.
In 1897, the same Thomson-Houston patents were challenged in the
Sixth Circuit. 69 Then-Judge Taft, writing for the circuit, came to the same
conclusion. He declared that he would not invalidate an earlier-filed
patent based on the happenstance that the Patent Office delayed issuing
the patent—through no fault of the patentee—“unless it is required by the
express words of the statute, or by the express holding of the Supreme
Court.” 70 This, again, is a patentee-based justification. But Judge Taft
went on. He emphasized that, in the later-filed but earlier-issued 1890
patent, the inventor “expressly states that he has an application pending
for the main invention . . . and thus shows beyond peradventure that he
has no intention of abandoning or dedicating to the public his main
64. See Winchester, 71 F. at 203.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 204.
67. Hoosick, 82 F. at 466–68.
68. See, e.g., Eagle Mfg. Co. v. Bradley, 35 F. 295, 298 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1888) (ruling that there
cannot be double patenting where “the issuance of two patents was not for the purpose of extending
the life of the monopoly, but was caused by the action of the patent-office.”).
69. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712 (6th Cir. 1897).
70. Id. at 724.
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invention.” 71 Thus, the 1890 patent, on its face, informs the public that
there may be other relevant patent protection.
Birmingham Cement Mfg. Co. v. Gates Iron Works 72
Other courts of that era disagreed. In 1896, the Fifth Circuit declared
in dicta that it was “untenable” to treat an earlier-filed but later-issued
patent any differently than a later-filed and later-issued patent. 73 Emerson
Stringham, in his 1933 treatise DOUBLE PATENTING, agrees. 74
Presumably, they understand the prohibition on double patenting as
ensuring that the public gets to use inventions (and their obvious variants)
claimed in expired patents, and they do not accept Judge Taft’s suggestion
that double patenting should depend on what is disclosed in the
specification of the challenged patent.
The C.C.P.A. and Federal Circuit’s Approach
The C.C.P.A. took a particularly harsh approach to earlier-filed but
later-issued patents. In In re Griswold, the C.C.P.A. allowed a form of
patent patricide. Griswold filed a patent application, and while it was
pending, he filed a continuation-in-part application. The continuation-inpart application issued first. The examiner rejected the earlier-filed parent
application for double patenting based on its own child, and the Federal
Circuit affirmed. 75 The child killed the parent.
That said, in cases where the later-filed application issues first, the
Federal Circuit applies a modified version of ODP. Normally, the question
for ODP is only whether the claims in the later-issued patent would have
been obvious over the claims of the earlier-issued patent (a “one-way”
test). 76 Where the later-filed application issues first, however, an ODP
rejection is proper only if each set of claims would have been obvious
over the other (the “two-way” test). 77 The Federal Circuit has emphasized,
71. Id. at 726.
72. Birmingham Cement Mfg. Co. v. Gates Iron Works, 78 F. 350 (5th Cir. 1896).
73. Id. at 360.
74. STRINGHAM, supra note 41, § 2854, 368–72. Stringham is the preeminent scholar on
double patenting. See In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
75. In re Griswold, 365 F.2d 834, 840 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
76. In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
77. In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589, 593–94 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing earlier cases). Robert Armitage
argues that Braat “perverts” the earlier caselaw by allowing the earlier-filed application to ever be
invalidated. Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Double Patenting. . . But Never Realized
That You Needed to Ask (From the Makers of Prozac), The “Innovation Act”: Appendix to Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 170, 189 (Oct. 29, 2013).
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though, that the two-way test is a “narrow exception” limited to the
“unusual circumstance” where the delay of the earlier-filed application
was “through no fault of the applicants.” 78 The court’s allowance for the
possibility of patent patricide suggests a public-rights justification for
ODP, but the mitigating two-way test exists to prevent injustice to the
patentee.
B.

Earlier-Issued but Later-Expiring Patents After the URAA
1. District Court and Patent-Office Decisions on Earlier-Issued
but Later-Expiring Patents

The URAA created a new ODP question: can an earlier-issued patent
be invalidated for ODP over a later-issued (and perhaps even later-filed)
patent? This question is both troubling and common for continuation
patents where the parent patent has PTA. If the justification for ODP is
that the public should be free to use any invention (and obvious variations)
claimed in an expired patent, then ODP should apply to an earlier-issued
patent as much as to a later-issued one. After all, the public is equally
harmed. On the other hand, a patentee who files a later-issuing but earlierexpiring patent has done nothing wrong.
The first cases to address the effects of the URAA dealt with
situations where one application was filed before the URAA and the other
application was filed after. Because pre-URAA patents expire 17 years
from issuance, while post-URAA patents expire 20 years from the
effective filing date, the earlier-issued patent often expired later. Until the
Federal Circuit’s 2014 opinion in Gilead, 79 the Patent Office assumed that
the later-issued patent could serve as an ODP reference, while district
courts assumed it could not.
The Patent Office’s Decision in Ex parte Pfizer, Inc. 80
In 1994 (i.e., before the URAA), 81 Pfizer filed for a patent on its
blockbuster drug Viagra, and it received its ’012 patent in 2002. Several
drug companies asked the Patent Office to reexamine the patent. On
78. Berg, 140 F.3d at 1432; accord Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 969 n.7
(Fed. Cir. 2001). Judge Newman believes that the “no fault” rule is too strict. Lilly, 251 F.3d at 973
(Newman, J., dissenting).
79. Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
80. Ex parte Pfizer, No. 2009-4106, 2010 WL 532133, at *1 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 12, 2010).
81. To be precise, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) application was filed in 1994 and the
national entry was in 1996. That suffices for receiving a term of 17 years from issuance. See MPEP
§ 2701 (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).
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reexamination, the Examiner rejected one of the claims for ODP over
three patents by one Campbell—all owned by Pfizer but unrelated to the
’012 patent. The first, Campbell 270, was filed after the ’012’s priority
date, but it issued before the ’012 patent. The other two, Campbell 511
and Campbell 945, were filed and issued after the ’012 patent. Because of
the URAA, though, all three Campbell patents were set to expire before
the ’012 patent.

Figure 2: Timeline of Pfizer’s patent prosecution

This fact scenario presents two interesting ODP questions. First, can
Campbell 270, which was filed after the ’012 patent’s parent but issued
before the ’012 patent, serve as an ODP reference? The parties assumed
it could—and, at least before the URAA, this was the case. 82 Second, can
Campbell 511 and Campbell 945 serve as ODP references to the ’012
patent, which was both filed and issued earlier than those two references?
Before the URAA, an earlier-issued patent would always expire earlier,
so this was a non-issue. The Patent Office’s Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences held that the URAA changed how ODP works: the ’012
patent would “exclude the public from practicing” the earlier-expiring
patents, which “is precisely what obviousness-type double patenting was

82.

See, e.g., Lilly, 251 F.3d at 962, 968–72.
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intended to prevent.” 83 The Board therefore affirmed the ODP rejection
based on a later-filed and later-issued patent.
The next year, however, two Delaware district courts came to the
opposite conclusion—focusing on the fact that the patentee did nothing
wrong in obtaining the later-issued patent.
The Delaware District Court Decisions in Brigham and Abbott
In Brigham & Women’s Hospital Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,
Inc., two pre-URAA patents, the ’068 and ’003 patents (which happened
to have their own unrelated terminal disclaimers), were challenged for
ODP over a later-filed, later-issued, unrelated, post-URAA patent that
expired earlier, the ’244 patent. 84

Figure 3: Timeline of Brigham’s patent prosecution
The district court believed there was no reason for the patentee to lose
patent term based on a “later-filed, later-issued” patent, and it was “not
persuaded by the Board’s reasoning” in Pfizer. 85 There was no reason to
punish a patentee who obtained “a valid, earlier-granted patent with a
longer term” or to shorten the “patent protection to which plaintiffs were
already entitled.” 86
Later that year, in Abbott Laboratories v. Lupin Ltd., another
Delaware court was faced with a similar situation but with a patent83. Ex parte Pfizer, 2010 WL 532133, at *21 (emphasis added).
84. Brigham & Women’s Hosp. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,761 F. Supp. 2d 210, 214 (D.
Del. 2011).
85. Id. at 225.
86. Id.
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patricide twist: the ODP reference, the ’930 patent, was a continuation-inpart of the earlier-filed but later-expiring ’428 patent. 87

Figure 4: Timeline of Abbott’s patent prosecution

The Abbott court agreed with Brigham and concluded that the ’428 patent
was immune to an ODP challenge from the later-issued patent because
there was no “improper gamesmanship by the patentee.” 88
The Patent Office’s decision in Ex Parte Martek Biosciences
Corp. 89
In 2013, the Patent Office Patent Trial and Appeal Board (the
successor to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences) had the issue
come up again. In Martek, an examiner rejected the earlier-filed, earlierissued, pre-URAA ’244 patent (not the Merck 244 patent discussed above)
for ODP over a later-filed, later-issued, post-URAA ’225 patent. Both
patents were continuations-in-part of a common application filed in 1992.

87. Abbott Labs. v. Lupin Ltd., No. 09-cv-152, 2011 WL 1897322, at *1 (D. Del. May 19,
2011).
88. Id. at *9–10 (emphasis added).
89. Ex parte Martek Biosciences Corp., No. 2012-10020, 2013 WL 3326850 (P.T.A.B. May
21, 2013).
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Figure 5: Timeline of Martek’s patent prosecution

The Board believed the relationship between the patents was a
critical distinction from Pfizer and the two Delaware decisions. 90
According to the Board, Martek should have filed all the claims of the
later patents in the parent 1992 application, and it was Martek’s fault for
deciding “to wait to file.” 91 It therefore invalidated the claims of the ’244
patent. Thus, Martek seems to meld a public rights and patentee-based
justification: since the patentee could have avoided the situation, the
public’s right prevails.
2. The Federal Circuit’s broad application of ODP in its 2014
Gilead and AbbVie decisions
In 2014, the Federal Circuit issued two decisions, both of which
suggested that a later-issued patent could serve as an ODP reference
against an earlier-issued one based on a public-rights rationale.
Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd. 92
After the URAA, Gilead filed two unrelated patent applications for
its Oseltamivir product. The first was filed on February 26, 1996 and
issued as the ’375 patent on September 14, 1999. The second was filed on
December 27, 1996 and issued as the ’483 patent on June 9, 1998—that
is, the second patent was a later-filed but earlier-issued patent.

90. Id. at *10–11.
91. Id. at *12.
92. Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 1530 (2015).
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Figure 6: Timeline of Gilead’s patent prosecution

When Gilead sued Natco for infringing the later-expiring
’483 patent, Natco responded that the ’483 patent was invalid for ODP
over the ’375 patent. 93 Relying on Brigham and Abbott, a New Jersey
court concluded that Gilead’s later-issued patent could not serve as an
ODP reference against the earlier-issued one. 94
Natco appealed, and the Federal Circuit reversed.95 Judge Chen
wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Judge Prost, over a
dissent by Chief Judge Rader. The dispute centered on the justification for
ODP. Quoting Justice Story’s second justification for prohibiting double
patenting, the majority ruled that ODP was “primarily designed” to ensure
that the “public . . . [has] the right to use the invention at the expiration of
the term”—and this was the doctrine’s “core principle.” 96 Accordingly,
the majority ruled that, come the expiration of the ’375 patent, “the public
should have the right to use the invention claimed in the patent and all
obvious variants of that invention.” 97
The majority recognized that the Supreme Court had previously held
that an earlier-issued patent could not be challenged based on a laterissuing patent. 98 However, it concluded that this was no longer true.
Before the URAA, the issue date and expiration date were “inextricably
intertwined,” and the cases discussing “issue dates” were really using the
issue date as a “reliable stand-in for the date that really mattered—patent
expiration.” 99 Now, however, only the expiration date mattered. 100

93. Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., No. 11-CV-1455 SDW-MCA, 2012 WL 6697411,
at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2012), vacated and remanded, 753 F.3d 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
94. Id. at *4.
95. Gilead, 753 F.3d at 1208.
96. Id. at 1212 (quoting Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail Factory, 18 F. Cas. 578, 579 (C.C.D. Mass.
1819) (No. 10,430)) (some citations omitted) (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 1214 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 1215 (citing Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151 U.S. 186, 197 (1894); Suffolk Co. v.
Hayden, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 315, 319 (1865)).
99. Id. at 1214–15.
100. Id. at 1215.
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The majority made only two allusions to patentee misconduct. The
first was a remark in the statement of the facts that Gilead had “crafted”
two separate chains of applications. 101 The second was the majority’s
second rationale for moving away from focusing on issue dates. The
majority worried that patentees could play games by filing multiple
applications with different filing dates and by then allowing the latestfiled one to issue first. 102
Judge Rader, meanwhile, did not accept the public-rights
justification. He criticized what he perceived as the majority’s “flawed
assumption that upon the expiration of a patent, the public obtains an
absolute right to use the previously-claimed subject matter.” 103 Rather,
according to Judge Rader, the problem with ODP was that a “patentee
could file successive continuations and obtain additional patent term for
obvious modifications of its earlier claim.” 104
AbbVie Inc. v. Kennedy Institute 105
Gilead was soon followed by another Federal Circuit case with a
similar result. The Kennedy Institute owned two related post-URAA
patents on methods of treating rheumatoid arthritis using a combination
of two products. The first patent was the ’766 patent, which issued in
2001. Filed on August 1, 1996, it claimed priority to a 1992 application
through a continuation-in-part. Thus, the patent was set to expire twenty
years from 1992, i.e., in 2012. In 2005, the Institute filed a continuation
of a continuation of this application, which issued as the ’442 patent. This
time, though, the Institute claimed priority only to the August 1, 1996
date, so this patent would have been set to expire in 2016. 106 Additionally,
the ’442 patent had 750 days of PTA, and it was therefore set to expire on
August 21, 2018.

101. Id. at 1210.
102. Id. at 1214–15.
103. Id. at 1219 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (emphases added).
104. Id. at 1217 (emphasis added).
105. AbbVie Inc., v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology Trust, 764 F.3d 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
106. Id. at 1373 n.2.
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Figure 7: Timeline of the Kennedy Institute’s patent prosecution

AbbVie had a license on the earlier ’766 patent. When the ’442 patent
issued in 2010, the Kennedy Institute demanded that AbbVie take a
license on that patent as well. AbbVie refused and sought a declaratory
judgment that the ’442 patent was invalid for ODP over the ’766 patent.
The district court granted the motion, 107 and the Federal Circuit affirmed.
The unanimous opinion, authored by Judge Dyk and joined by Judges
Wallach and Chen, again emphasized the public’s right: “The ban on
double patenting ensures that the public gets the benefit of the invention
after the original period of monopoly expires”—and does not exist just to
curb potential patentee “abuse[]” based on sequential filings. 108 In dicta,
Abbvie declared that ODP could apply even where one patent expires later
through no fault of the patentee but rather based on the Patent Office’s
“examination delays” that lead to “patent term adjustments.” 109
Abbvie did recognize that the patentee might have abused the system.
It was troubled by the possibility that a patentee, like the Institute, might
“choose[] to file separate applications for overlapping subject matter and
to claim different priority dates for the applications.” 110 However,
Abbvie’s holding was not premised on that possibility.

107. AbbVie Inc., v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology Trust, 956 F. Supp.
2d 429, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 764 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
108. AbbVie, 764 F.3d at 1373 (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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Gilead/AbbVie’s Children
Gilead and AbbVie made an immediate splash. Practitioners had
assumed that an earlier-issued patent could not lose term based on a laterissued one 111 (the Patent Office decisions in Pfizer and Martek
notwithstanding). That was certainly no longer true. The scope of Gilead,
however, remained unclear. Most significantly, the two patents in Gilead
were unrelated, and the two patents in AbbVie, although related, claimed
different effective filing dates. The more common scenario is overlapping
claims among related patents that have the same effective filing date. This
will typically happen where the Patent Office takes more time to issue the
first application in a family, leading to the first patent receiving significant
PTA. Later continuation patents, meanwhile, are often quickly allowed,
and they will have little to no PTA. 112 In such cases, can the continuation
commit patent patricide? 113
It did not take long for this issue to come up in district courts, and
most ruled that the child could kill its parent. These courts all quoted
Gilead’s language that the primary justification for ODP was to protect
the right of the public to use inventions claimed in expired patents. 114
Largely, these cases involved a later-expiring pre-URAA patent and an
earlier-expiring post-URAA patent, 115 but one involved only post-URAA
patents—where the difference in expiration date came from PTA. 116
Judge Robinson’s 2016 decision in Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. v.
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., refusing to allow patent patricide, is the
one exception. 117 Merck’s pre-URAA ’353 patent was challenged for
111. See, e.g., Laurence H. Posorske & Christopher J. Nichols, Will Novartis and Gilead
Eviscerate Patent Term Adjustments?, 28(2) INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 11, 13 (2016); N. Scott
Pierce, Inventorship, Double Patenting, and the America Invents Act, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1613,
1674–83 (2015); Emily A. Evans & Jill A. Jacobson, Double Patenting Recapitulated, 87 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 625, 630 (2005).
112. Posorke & Nichols, supra note 111, at 13.
113. See Amelia F. Baur & Elizabeth A. Doherty, Navigating Through the Obviousness-Type
Double Patenting Minefield, 10(3) LANDSLIDE 48, 51 (2018).
114. Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Breckenridge Pharm., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 3d 578, 586 (D. Del.
2017), rev’d 909 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2018); MLC Intellectual Prop., LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., No.
14-cv-3657, 2017 WL 1493025, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2017); Janssen Biotech, Inc. v. Celltrion
Healthcare Co., 210 F. Supp. 3d 278, 280 (D. Mass 2016); Magna Elecs., Inc. v. TRW Auto. Holdings
Corp., No. 1:12-cv-654, 2015 WL 11430786, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 10, 2015); DDB Techs., L.L.C.
v. Fox Sports Interactive Media, LLC, No. A-11-cv-929, 2014 WL 12167628, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May
15, 2014).
115. Novartis, 248 F. Supp. 3d at 578; MLC, 2017 WL 1493025, at *7; Janssen, 210 F. Supp.
3d at 278; DDB, 2014 WL 12167628, *4.
116. Magna, 2015 WL 11430786, at *3.
117. Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 782, 787–88
(D. Del. Nov. 14, 2016), appeal dismissed, No. 17-1366 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 6, 2017).
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ODP over its direct continuation—the ’781 patent, which was also a preURAA patent.

Figure 8: Timeline of Merck’s patent prosecution 118

Because both patents were subject to the pre-URAA rules, the later-issued
’781 patent would normally expire later. But there was a hitch. During
prosecution of the ’781 patent, Merck’s application went abandoned, and
to revive it, Merck had to disclaim the time during which the application
was abandoned. 119 As a result, Merck’s ’781 patent was going to expire
before the ’353 patent (this is the unicorn of situations for pre-URAA
patents, where the later-issued patent expires earlier).
Although both patents were pre-URAA patents, Judge Robinson did
not find this significant. Instead, she assumed Gilead was applicable but
distinguished it because of the “particular circumstances” of patent
patricide: it would not be fair to the patentee for the child patent to be an
ODP reference against “the first issued parent patent.” 120
3. The Federal Circuit’s Narrow Application of ODP in Its 2018
Novartis Decisions
Last year, the Federal Circuit issued two decisions, coincidentally
both involving Novartis, that appear to pull back from the Gilead/AbbVie
framework. The first was Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v.
Breckenridge Pharmaceutical Inc., 121 and the second was Novartis AG v.
Ezra Ventures LLC. 122
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 787.
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.137 (2018).
Merck, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 787–88.
Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Breckenridge Pharm. Inc., 909 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Novartis AG v. Ezra Ventures LLC, 909 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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In Breckenridge, Novartis Pharmaceuticals owned two patents
covering the drug Zortress: the earlier-filed, earlier-issued, pre-URAA
’772 patent and the later-filed, later-issued, post-URAA ’990 patent—a
(non-safe-harbored) divisional of the ’772 patent. Because of the URAA,
the ’772 patent was set to expire later.

Figure 9: Timeline of Novartis’s Zortress patent prosecution

The parties agreed that if the ’990 patent was a proper ODP
reference, then it invalidated the ’772 patent. District Judge Andrews
believed that Gilead was applicable, and he ruled that there was an ODP
problem. 123
The Federal Circuit reversed. 124 The appeal happened to go to a panel
that included Judge Chen, who authored the majority opinion in Gilead,
and (now Chief) Judge Prost, who joined in Gilead. The third judge in
Breckenridge was Judge Wallach, instead of Gilead’s Judge Rader—who
had since resigned from the Federal Circuit.
In a unanimous opinion authored by Judge Chen, the Federal Circuit
ruled that Gilead was inapplicable for several reasons. The first was that
Gilead involved two “post-URAA” patents, whereas Novartis had one
pre- and one post-URAA patent. 125 Although this is a distinction, the
Breckenridge court does little to explain why this this should make a
difference.

123.
2017).
124.
125.

Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Breckenridge Pharm., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 3d 578, 600 (D. Del.
Novartis, 909 F.3d at 1355.
Id. at 1358.
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Breckenridge’s other reason is more persuasive: it argues that there
was no evidence that the patentee, Novartis, did anything to game the
system—unlike the patentees in Gilead/AbbVie. Gilead “‘crafted a
separate “chain” of application,’” which suggests there may have been
“gamesmanship” on Gilead’s part. 126 AbbVie involved “an inventor[]
seeking to prolong his exclusivity” by filing two patents with “different”
priority dates. 127 In its conclusion, Breckenridge reiterated that ODP
exists to “prevent a patent owner from extending the exclusivity rights
over his invention beyond a full patent term. We saw this impermissible
practice in Gilead and in AbbVie, where the patent owners claimed
different effective filing dates for different patents (involving related
inventions) to extend the life of patent exclusivity.” 128 Thus, the Federal
Circuit in Breckenridge was framing Gilead and AbbVie as cases where
patentees gamed the system by playing with filing dates. Novartis,
meanwhile, was just filing normal continuation applications that
happened to expire earlier than their parents, so a later-issued continuation
patent should not be able to commit patent patricide. Thus, Breckenridge
does not put much stock in the public-rights justification for ODP.
The same day that the Judge Chen issued his Breckenridge opinion,
he also issued another ODP decision in Ezra. 129 Novartis held two patents
covering its drug Gilenya, but the two patents were unrelated to one
another. One was its pre-URAA ’229 patent, which was filed in 1993 and
issued in 1997, and the other was its post-URAA ’565 patent, which was
filed in 1997 and issued in 1999. The ’229 patent was set to expire in 2014,
and the ’565 patent was set to expire in 2017. Novartis then received PTE
on its ’229 patent, extending the term until 2019.

126. Id. at 1364 (quoting Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1210 (Fed.
Cir. 2014)).
127. Id. at 1364–65 (analyzing AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of
Rheumatology Trust, 764 F.3d 1366, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
128. Id. at 1367.
129. Id.
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Figure 10: Timeline of Novartis’s Gilenya patent prosecution 130

When Novartis sued Ezra for infringing the ’229 patent, Ezra argued
that the ’229 patent was invalid for ODP. Delaware’s Judge Stark rejected
Ezra’s argument, ruling that ODP cannot cut PTE short. 131 The Federal
Circuit affirmed. After finding that the statute and its own prior case law
mandated this result, the Federal Circuit turned to “Ezra’s Policy
Concerns.” 132 It explained that the case “does not present the concerns that
drove [the] recent decisions” in Gilead and AbbVie. 133 Gilead, it
explained, sought to avoid situations where patentees “orchestrate” longer
exclusivities, but “Ezra does not identify any similar tactics on the part of
Novartis.” 134 Again, Judge Chen relied on patentee-based justifications
for ODP and did not put much weight in the public-rights justifications.
IV. PATENT PATRICIDE IS BAD POLICY BUT NOT UNPRECEDENTED
Patent patricide is sometimes a billion-dollar question. Patents on
pharmaceutical drugs can be worth billions of dollars a year, 135 and these
130. Novartis AG v. Ezra Ventures, LLC, 909 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
131. Novartis AG v. Ezra Ventures, LLC, No. 15-150, 2016 WL 5334464, at *3 (D. Del. Sept.
22, 2016).
132. Ezra, 909 F.3d at 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1375 (quoting Gilead Scis. Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1215 (Fed. Cir.
2014)).
135. Jamie F. Cárdenas-Navia, Thirty Years of Flawed Incentives: An Empirical and Economic
Analysis of Hatch-Waxman Patent-Term Restoration, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 1347 (2014);
Verne A. Luckow & Steven C. Balsarotti, Statistical Analysis of Federal District Court Cases Seeking
Longer Patent Term Adjustments in the Wake of Wyeth v. Kappos, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 1, 21, 44 (2010).
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patents often have years of PTA. 136 So the PTA is worth billions of
dollars. It is common practice for inventors to file continuation
applications, 137 but if continuation applications can commit patent
patricide, those continuation applications may not be worth it.
A.

The Federal Circuit’s Inconsistent Signals about Patent Patricide

Pre-URAA patents are obsolescent. Such patents had to be filed on
June 7, 1995 and had to issue less than 17 years ago. The billion-dollar
question is how ODP applies to post-URAA patents that are related.
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s statements provide inconsistent
guidance.
Gilead/AbbVie’s Broad Statements
Although Gilead and AbbVie involved the more troubling situation
of a patentee filing multiple patents with different priority dates, they both
rely on the public’s right to use expired patents. The public-rights
rationale applies just as much to patents having the same filing date as to
patents that have different filing dates. Moreover, AbbVie (in a
parenthetical) even discusses the situation of related patents having
different expiration dates due to PTA. 138 Thus, Gilead/AbbVie would
seem to allow patent patricide even for a standard continuation
application.
Breckenridge’s Descriptions of Its Own Scope
Breckenridge describes its own facts as “present[ing] a narrow legal
question: can a post-URAA patent that issues after and expires before a
pre-URAA patent qualify as a double patenting reference against the preURAA patent?” 139 The court “conclude[s] under the circumstances of this
case that it cannot.” 140 All these caveats suggest that the Federal Circuit
does not want to make waves with this opinion. And these are not just
136. Luckow & Balsarotti, supra note 135, at 8.
137. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Continuing Patent Applications and
Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office as of Fiscal Year 2017 (Mar. 19, 2018) at 5,
PROPERTY
INSTITUTE,
Research
Paper
No.
2018-01,
INTELLECTUAL
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3147056 [https://perma.cc/KXJ5-6KBN].
138. AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology Trust, 764 F.3d 1366,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
139. Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Breckenridge Pharm. Inc., 909 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
140. Id. at 1361–62.
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one-off remarks. Breckenridge repeatedly emphasizes that it would be
unfair for a patentee to lose term based on the URAA’s “intervening
change in law,” and it emphasizes Congress’s concern with giving preURAA patents their “maximum possible term.” 141 None of those reasons
apply to ODP for two post-URAA patents.
How the Novartis Decisions Distinguish Gilead and AbbVie
Breckenridge distinguishes Gilead and AbbVie for two reasons: first,
those cases involved two post-URAA patents, and second, in those cases
the patentee played games with the claimed priority dates. 142 But what if
only one of the rationales is present—like a case involving two postURAA patents with no gaming of priority dates. Can the child commit
patent patricide?
Ezra is similarly ambiguous. The court ruled that there were statutory
reasons that ODP should not cut PTE short. But it also noted that Novartis
had not used improper “tactics” to extend its monopoly. Are improper
“tactics” a requirement for an ODP rejection?
The Differing Justifications for ODP
As this article has detailed, there have always been multiple
justifications for prohibiting ODP: (1) the public has a “right to use the
invention at the expiration of the term,” and (2) the patentee should not be
permitted to “perpetuate his exclusive right during a century” where the
Patent Act limits patent term. 143
This dichotomy is, possibly, the distinction between Gilead/AbbVie,
on the one hand, and the Novartis decisions on the other. According to
Gilead and AbbVie, “the bar against double patenting was created to
preserve that bargained-for right held by the public.” 144 By contrast,
Breckenridge describes the “key purpose” of the ODP doctrine as
“prevent[ing] a patent owner from extending the exclusivity rights over
his invention beyond a full patent term,” and both Novartis decisions are
troubled by the “gamesmanship” in Gilead and AbbVie. 145
141. Id. at 1357–59, 1364, 1366–67.
142. Id. at 1365–67.
143. Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail Factory, 18 F. Cas. 578, 579 (C.C.D. Mass. 1819) (No. 10,430)
(emphasis added).
144. AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda & Terence Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology Trust, 764 F.3d 1366,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Gilead Scis. Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1212 (Fed.
Cir. 2014)) (citations omitted; emphasis added).
145. Breckenridge, 909 F.3d at 1362, 1367 (emphasis added); Novartis AG v. Ezra Ventures,
LLC, 909 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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The justification is critical for how to apply ODP to continuation
applications. If the reason for ODP is that the public should always be free
to use an expired patent, then it should not matter whether the expired
patent is a parent or a continuation. Nor should any of the other factors be
relevant either: it should not matter whether the expired patent is (1) a preor post-URAA patent; (2) the earlier-filed or later-filed patent; (3) the
earlier- or later-issued patent; or (4) related to the challenged patent. Once
a patent expires, the public is free to use the patented invention and its
obvious variations. Gilead and AbbVie, which focus on the free-to-useupon-expiration rationale, thus suggest a very broad application of ODP.
By contrast, if the concern underlying ODP is an unfair extension of the
patentee’s rights, an earlier-filed, earlier-issued patent (at the very least)
should keep one full patent term independent of whether a later
application is filed.
B.

The Federal Circuit Should Not Allow Patent Patricide

At some point, the Federal Circuit will have to decide whether a
standard continuation application that issues after its parent can serve as
an ODP reference against its earlier-issued parent. The court should
conclude that it cannot. First, “the traditional obviousness-type double
patenting practices extant in the pre-URAA era” was to look at the
patent’s “issuance date.” 146 History thus favors letting an earlier-issued
patent keep its full term.
Second, as explained above, §121 of the Patent Act shows that a
patentee who has done nothing wrong should not be forced to give up term
for ODP. Allowing patent patricide would do just that.
Third, in most cases, the later-issuing patent will be the continuation
patent—a fact that will be evident on the face of the patent. 147 A member
of the public reading the continuation patent will therefore recognize that
the rights conferred by the patent are subject to the pre-existing rights
from the parent patent. Therefore, as Judge Taft explained, the public is
on notice that there may be other relevant patents. 148
Fourth, normally, “the duration of the term of the United States
patent is fixed when the patent issues.” 149 Unless a patentee does
something that deserves punishment—like the gamesmanship of Gilead
146. Breckenridge, 909 F.3d at 1358.
147. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d) (2018).
148. See SHAFFER, supra note 41 (discussing Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co.,
80 F. 712, 728 (6th Cir. 1897)); accord WILES, supra note 39, at 505 (explaining that double patenting
should not apply where the reference patent gives “due notice” that it is a follow-on patent).
149. Paillard v. Bruno, 29 F. 864, 865 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
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and AbbVie—there is no reason that obtaining a later-issued patent should
affect the term of an earlier-issued one. Looking to the issue date solves
this problem: the first-issued patent gets its full term, and the inventor’s
decision to continue prosecuting applications will not cut that term short.
On the other hand, ODP still prevents an inventor who already has an
issued patent from extending her monopoly by receiving PTA on a laterissued continuation.
Fifth, a close statutory analogue to ODP shows that patent terms
should not change after the patent has been issued. In 1839, Congress
passed a statute that provided that if an inventor received a foreign patent
six months before filing a U.S. “application,” then the term of the U.S.
patent would be fourteen years (the statutory patent term at the time)
“from the date or publication of such foreign letters patent.” 150 In Bate
Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, the Supreme Court explained that the
1839 Act meant what it said about the U.S. “application” date: so long as
the U.S. application was filed before the grant of the foreign patent, it did
not matter when the U.S. patent itself issued. 151 The focus on the
application date seems to reflect a patentee-based concern that the
inventor should file in the U.S. first. Assuming the inventor does, she will
get her full patent term independent of which country happens to issue her
patent first.
However, in 1870 Congress changed the language to focus on the
“grant” date instead of the “application” date. Thus, the 1870 Act
provided that “every patent granted for an invention which has been
previously patented in a foreign country shall be so limited as to expire at
the same time with the foreign patent.” 152 Under the 1870 statute, the
Supreme Court explained, it did not matter where the inventor filed first.
What mattered was where the patent issued first. 153 As Bate explained,
this was a public-rights justification: “the American public became
entitled to use the invention from the time the foreign public were
permitted to use it.” 154 Notably, even in this public-rights scheme, the
Supreme Court still accepted that a patent’s term is fixed at the time of
issuance. A patentee would not lose term if the inventor failed to pay
foreign maintenance fees after the U.S. patent issued—even though this
would mean the foreign patent expired before the U.S. one. 155 By analogy
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

5 Stat. 354, c. 88, § 6 (1839).
Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 43 (1895).
Patent Act of 1890, Ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198–217 (July 8, 1870) (emphasis added).
See Bate, 157 U.S. at 35–36.
Id. at 36.
See Pohl v. Anchor Brewing Co., 134 U.S. 381, 385 (1890).
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to ODP (an analogy that the Supreme Court made), 156 once a domestic
patent issues, its term should be set for ODP purposes independent of what
happens after.
Sixth, even if Gilead is right to move away from the issue date, it is
not clear why the court moved to the expiration date. If, as Gilead claims,
pre-URAA issue dates were a “stand-in” for expiration dates, 157 then,
logically, courts should now look to the new “stand-in”: the effective
filing dates. Focusing on the effective filing date is particularly appealing
given that even before the URAA a minority of courts believed that a laterfiled patent could not serve as an ODP reference against an earlier-filed
one. 158 It bears noting that Gilead’s choice of the expiration date instead
of the effective filing date was unnecessary to Gilead’s holding. In Gilead,
the earlier-filed patent was the earlier-expiring one. The choice of the
expiration-date was dicta.
Focusing on the priority date instead of the expiration date will often
be quite important. In cases where two patents have different effective
filing dates, the approach described above would mean that the one with
the earlier filing date could not be invalidated for ODP over the one with
the later date—even if the earlier-filed one was set to expire later because
of PTA.
More significantly, in cases where two patents share the same
effective filing date—as will happen in essentially every continuation
application—looking to the filing date creates a tie. Before the URAA,
the rule was that when you had a tie, i.e., when two pre-URAA patents
issued on the same day, at the very least, the earlier-numbered patent was
unchallengeable in view of the later-numbered patent, and the majority
view was that neither patent could be challenged over the other. 159 As
applied to patents with the same effective filing dates, this would mean
that the earlier-issued patent could not be challenged over the later-issued
one, and, perhaps, both would be unchallengeable over the other.

156. See Fireball Gas Tank & Illuminating Co. v. Commercial Acetylene Co., 239 U.S. 156,
160–66 (1915).
157. Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 753 F.3d 1208, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
158. See STRINGHAM, supra note 39, §§ 2804(A), 2804(B), 50–58 (recognizing but criticizing
this view). For example, the Supreme Court in The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S. 275, 281 (1892),
writes that “the date of the application and not the date of the patent controls.” In Nat’l Elec. Ticket
Register v. Automatic Ticket Register Corp., 15 F.2d 257, 257–58 (2d. Cir. 1926), the court
invalidated one of Sullivan’s patents over his own earlier-filed but later-issued patent.
159. See 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS § 9.03(2)(d) (2018); STRINGHAM, supra note 39, §§ 2856,
2856(A), 379–83.
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Sometimes a Patentee’s Rights Change After Her Patent Issues

Despite the desire for having a patentee’s rights vest at the time a
patent issues, the Patent Act does, in at least one circumstance, allow for
post-issuance events to affect a patentee’s rights. If one patentee receives
a patent to an invention but a second inventor later decides to file claims
(from an earlier-filed application) to the same invention, the second
inventor’s post-issuance decision to amend her claims can, retroactively,
invalidate the first patent. 160 Nevertheless, one troubling law161 does not
justify another.
CONCLUSION
For a doctrine that has existed for two centuries, ODP is a
surprisingly unsettled area of law. As shown above, much of the confusion
stems from the differing justifications for ODP. Is the problem that a
patentee should not be able to unduly extend his or her patent term or is it
that the public should be entitled to assume that inventions claimed in an
expired patent are free to the public?
The implications are immense if an inventor is considering filing a
continuation application on a patent that has received significant PTA. For
now, applicants should consider (1) filing many claims in their original
applications to force restriction requirements, which provide a statutory
safe harbor from double patenting rejections 162; (2) not allowing a
continuation application to issue; and/or (3) keeping a live continuation
application to see how the law settles.

160. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir.
2015); id. at 1381 n.2. Even without Dynamic Drinkware, this can happen where an applicant allows
an earlier-filed application to publish.
161. See In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 537 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“[W]e will extend the ‘secret
prior art’ doctrine . . . only as far as we are required to do so.”).
162. See 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2012).
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